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Private Role in 
Public Permit 
Enforcement 
by Jessica Owley 
Jessica Owley is an Associate Professor, SUNY Bufalo Law School  
Summary 
Te past 40 years have seen an increase in the involve-
ment of private actors in environmental law One of the 
best-known (and arguably best-loved) methods for pub-
lic involvement is the citizen suit Tis popular method 
of public enforcement of environmental permits (among 
other things) has been joined by the use of conservation 
easements Conservation easements are increasingly 
used to meet permit mitigation requirements When 
private nonprofts hold these exacted conservation ease-
ments, they assume the role of permit enforcers It is 
their job to ensure that conservation easement terms 
are complied with, giving them oversight and control 
over one of the pivotal components of environmental 
permitting regimes Land-trust-held exacted conserva-
tion easements privatize enforcement of environmental 
law, much as citizen suits do However, exacted conser-
vation easements difer from citizen suits in that they 
foreclose public enforcement instead of complement it 
Use of exacted conservation easements would improve 
if we apply lessons about public involvement and infor-
mation from our citizen suit tradition  
In the 1970s, when state and federal legislatures passed most of our nation’s environmental laws, they did not contemplate the need for people power those 
laws embodied Our environmental laws involve labor-
intensive environmental review and permitting programs 
Te environmental review and permitting processes have 
only grown more comprehensive and cumbersome as we 
have learned more about environmental concerns and the 
potential impacts of our activities For example, advances 
in conservation biology have improved our decisionmak-
ing and environmental outcomes while also increasing the 
length and detail of things like endangered species permit 
reviews Te documents are longer, the public comments 
more numerous, and the need to consult more types of 
experts intensifed With numerous complicated permit-
ting schemes, enforcement and oversight are vital mecha-
nisms for success  
Several environmental laws led to this state of afairs 
Te National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 19691 
led to both intensive environmental review processes and 
protracted litigation involving agencies seeking to avoid or 
minimize their environmental review obligations 2 Pollution 
control laws—including the Clean Water Act (CWA),3 the 
Clean Air Act (CAA),4 and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)5—created new systems of report-
ing and permitting that involved studies, monitoring, and 
inspection of various environmental hazards Te new laws 
of the 1970s also often required entire new agencies and 
institutions 6 We saw the birth of the U S Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) on the federal level, and even more 
organizations and ofces in state and local governments  
Te U S Congress enacted these laws because it identi-
fed serious concerns with environmental quality, but it did 
not necessarily understand what the scope of the problem 
was or the implications of the legal requirements As EPA 
explained in the context of municipal and industrial waste: 
“Te RCRA statute, regulations, and programs were cre-
ated at a time when we did not know how much waste 
was produced or what happened to it What we knew for 
certain was that the waste needed to be safely managed ”7 
Author’s Note: Many thanks to K.K. DuVivier for organizing the 
AALS panel from which this essay emerged and to Jim Olmsted for 
his helpful comments and perpetual enthusiasm. 
1  42 U S C  §§4321-4370h, ELR Stat  NEPA §§2-209  
2  Richard J  Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 68 (2004)  
3  33 U S C  §§1251-1387, ELR Stat  FWPCA §§101-607  
4  42 U S C  §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat  CAA §§101-618  
5  42 U S C  §§6901-6992k, ELR Stat  RCRA §§1001-11011  
6  Id. at 74  
7  U S EPA, 25 Years of RCRA: Building on Our Past to Protect Our 
Future i (2002), EPA-K-02-207, available at http://www epa gov/osw/in-
foresources/pubs/k02027 pdf  
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With the goal of understanding and limiting environmen-
tal harm, Congress created comprehensive environmental 
protection programs that continue to expand to cover more 
entities and more areas  
I.  The Role of Private Parties in 
Environmental Enforcement:  
The Birth of Citizen Suits 
After the environmental reviews are complete and permits 
issued, the work does not (or at least should not) stop for 
environmental compliance agencies Permits require ongo-
ing oversight and stewardship Tis can include things as 
varied as on-the-ground assessments to judicial enforce-
ment actions Numerous studies have demonstrated inade-
quate monitoring and underenforcement in environmental 
permitting programs 8 Tese problems generally stem from 
reduced budgets and inadequate stafng 9 
Whenever government support for environmental pro-
tection has fagged, environmentally conscious members of 
the community have stepped up to fll the gap 10 In 1970, 
Joe Sax called on community members to lobby and push 
for environmental laws and enforcement 11 From the begin-
ning of the environmental law era, citizens have played 
important roles in the realization of environmental protec-
tion For example, environmental review and permitting 
processes have public comment periods where members of 
the public can participate, giving their opinions and lend-
ing their expertise to agency decisionmaking 12 
An even more important role, however, is that of the cit-
izen enforcer Citizen prosecution has been called “perhaps 
the most pervasive, prominent, and continuing innovation 
in the modern environmental era ”13 Several environmental 
laws—including the CAA, the CWA, and the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA)14—have provisions enabling citizens to 
8  See, e.g., Peter N Grabosky, Counterproductive Regulation, 23 Int’l J Soc 
L 347, 350 (1995) (describing many challenges that beset environmental 
laws including underenforcement); Rebecca L Kihslinger, Success of Wetland 
Mitigation Projects, 20 Nat’l Wetlands Newsl 14 (2008); Kelly Chinners 
Reiss et al , Evaluation of Permit Success in Wetland Mitigation Banking: A 
Florida Case Study, 29 Wetlands 907 (2009)  
9  Evidence supports this hypothesis, showing slowdowns in federal enforce-
ment when EPA’s budget is reduced Fewer staf members and lower fund-
ing levels at EPA mean fewer government enforcement actions Wayne Nay-
snerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental 
Law, 68 Land Econ  28, 35 (1992)  
10 Lazarus, supra note 2, at 81  
11 Joseph L Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen 
Action 234 (1971)  
12 While environmental review statutes do not require policymakers to adopt 
suggestions submitted by members of the public, the agencies do have to 
consider and respond to any suggestions or comments ofered 40 C F R 
§1502 9(b); Ronald E  Bass et al , The NEPA Book 120 (2001)  
13 Barton H Tompson, Te Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 
2000 U  Ill  L  Rev  185, 185(2000)  
14 16 U S C  §§1531-1544, ELR Stat  ESA §§2-18  
enforce parts of the environmental permitting programs 15 
Under these laws, citizens16 can bring suit against public 
or private polluters in violation of their environmental per-
mits 17 Te citizen enforcement mechanisms (sometimes 
called private attorneys general) promote environmen-
tal protection and expand the number of eyes on a proj-
ect 18 Using these provisions, nonproft organizations have 
improved the efectiveness of our environmental laws by 
essentially adding staf to public environmental enforce-
ment divisions and working to stem potential problems 
from agency capture  
Congress included citizen suit provisions in our envi-
ronmental statutes due to concerns with agencies and 
their structure Tere was recognition from the begin-
ning that agencies may not have the capacity or interest 
in pursuing all permit violations 19 “Public agencies have 
limited budgets, respond to local economic conditions, 
and may be sensitive to regulatory capture ”20 If govern-
ment enforcement were complete, there would be no need 
for private enforcers Studies demonstrate that in times 
of reduced government enforcement, private enforce-
ment actions increase 21 Tis is one of the reasons why 
citizen suits did not really blossom until the 1980s, when 
widespread concerns about lax government enforcement 
spurred nonprofts and concerned citizens to take matters 
into their own hands 22 
Te success of citizen suits as an enforcement mecha-
nism is tied to the availability of public information about 
15 Citizen suits can also take the form of trying to force agencies to do their 
jobs (suing government agencies alleged to have failed to perform discre-
tionary duties); as those do not embody the same type of privatization, I 
do not discuss them here For an excellent Article on the scope and success 
of such cases, see Robert L Glicksman, Te Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen 
Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 Widener L  Rev  353 (2004)  
16 Of course, these types of actions are limited to parties with standing, which 
can be challenging to show in environmental cases (particularly so for ESA 
cases) Cass Sunstein, Whose Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, Injuries,
and Article III, 91 Mich L Rev 163 (1992) Suits under the CWA have 
far less trouble with standing See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found v Gwaltney 
of Smithfeld, Ltd , 611 F Supp 1542, 15 ELR 20663 (1985) (ruling that 
plaintif organization only need show either members using the water ways 
or members adversely afected by potential pollution)  
17 State and local governments also use citizen suit provisions or allow public 
enforcement through other routes  
18 Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 9  
19 Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 9, at 31  
20 Christian Landpap & Jay P Shimshack, Private Citizen Suits and Public 
Enforcement: Substitutes or Complements?, 59 J Envtl Econ & Mgmt 235 
(2010) (citing article that explains that the enforcement is lax against plants 
where they are likely to close in response to an enforcement action); Mary 
Deily & Wayne Gray, Enforcement of Pollution Regulations in a Declining 
Industry, 21 J Envtl  Econ  & Mgmt  260 (1991)  
21 Landpap & Shimshack, supra note 20, at 237 An alternative story would be 
that there are just fewer violations to enforce against, but that does not hold 
true if the private enforcement actions increase  
22 See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A 
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Law, 
34 Buff L Rev 833 (1985); James May, Now More Tan Ever: Trends in 
Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 Widener L  Rev  1, 2 (2003)  
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things like pollutant discharges 23 Without knowledge of 
the permitting requirements, we would be slower to realize 
that citizen suits were needed Such suits, however, are also 
limited by the availability of information Unlike govern-
ment ofcials, nonprofts and private citizens cannot enter 
private property to conduct on-site inspections Citizen 
enforcers are heavily reliant on self-monitoring reports  
Environmental citizen suits appear to have increased 
the level of environmental protection or at least the level 
of environmental enforcement 24 Without citizen suits, key 
resources would have been polluted, endangered species 
habitat lost, and creatures threatened Frankly, our waters 
and air would be dirtier Citizen suits also have had two 
less direct efects  
First, citizen suites ofer public entities a glimpse at the 
power of private organizations Citizen suits illustrate the 
public’s interest in environmental law along with a will-
ingness and ability to take on environmental enforcement 
duties As environmental organizations grow in capacity, 
they develop skills previously housed in agencies Some-
times the organizations go even further than the agencies 
can in hiring staf and developing expertise One Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) employee confessed to me 
that the Center for Biological Diversity had a better capac-
ity to monitor and assess the needs of endangered spe-
cies on BLM lands he worked on than he did Te BLM 
employee explained that he simply waited for the nonproft 
(via litigation and letters to the agency) to tell him what he 
should be working on  
Second, citizen suits empowered nonproft citizen 
groups Long-standing environmental organizations like 
the Sierra Club hired attorneys and began to actively use 
the courts to seek improvements to ecosystem health New 
organizations emerged in the 1970s, including NRDC 
(Natural Resources Defense Council) and EDF (Environ-
mental Defense Fund) Te newer organization recognized 
the power they could wield as citizen enforcers early on 
Alongside the growth in citizen suits was the growth in the 
number of nonproft environmental organizations Tis is 
particularly easy to see with land conservation organiza-
tions (called land trusts) In 1970, there were fewer than 
300 land trusts, today they number around 1,700 25 
23 John C Dernbach, Citizen Suits and Sustainability, 10 Widener L Rev 
503, 507 (2004); Robert F Blomquist, Te Logic and Limits of Public Infor-
mation Mandates Under Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy Analysis, 14 
Vt L Rev 559 (1990); Tom Tietenberg, Disclosure Strategies for Pollution 
Control, 11 Envtl & Resource Econ 587 (1998) (detailing the impor-
tance of information disclosure in protecting environmental health)  
24 May, supra note 22, at 3  
25 Nancy McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement 
Donations—A Responsible Approach, 31 Ecology L Q 1, 21 (2004); Katie 
Change, 2010 National Land Trust Census 5-7 (Land Trust Alliance 
& Lincoln Inst of Land Policy 2011), available at http://www landtrustal-
liance org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/
2010-fnal-report (indicating that there may be some leveling of in the 
number of land trusts, while the number of acres of land protected and 
number of conservation easements contains to increase)  
II.  Increasing Privatization:  Are 
Conservation Easements the 
New Citizen Suit? 
Citizen suits privatize environmental enforcement While 
they do not (and indeed cannot) supplant federal enforce-
ment, cases proceed and obtain favorable judgments lead-
ing to increased environmental protection Where citizen 
groups actively engage in environmental enforcement, pub-
lic enforcers have reduced burdens Alongside the fourishing 
of private enforcement through citizen suits, public agencies 
began to involve private organizations in other aspects of 
environmental law In particular, as private organizations 
have increasingly become involved in environmental per-
mitting programs, they become enforcers of environmental 
law in another way Specifcally, land trusts are becoming 
involved in carrying out one of the main elements of envi-
ronmental permitting programs: mitigation requirements 
As stewards of mitigation, land trusts enforce environmen-
tal laws without bringing citizen suits  
Many environmental laws prohibit environmental 
degradation outright, but then allow for environmentally 
destructive activities by permit 26 Permit programs gener-
ally require that project proponents avoid, minimize, and 
mitigate environmental harms arising from the proposed 
project 27 For example, under §404 of the CWA, permit-
tees receive permission to alter wetlands in exchange for 
promises to mitigate harm from that wetland alteration 28 
Similarly, §10 of the ESA creates a permit program for inci-
dental takes of endangered species 29 Under §10, developers 
can avoid criminal charges for violations of the take prohi-
bition (i e , harming individuals of a species or altering spe-
cies’ critical habitat) by creating habitat conservation plans 
(HCPs) and receiving §10 incidental take permits 30 Te 
HCP must outline procedures to mitigate negative impacts 
on listed species 31 
A. 	 Land	Trusts 
Land trusts are nonproft land conservation organizations 32 
Among their land conservation strategies are holding fee-
simple title and conservation easements over property that 
they have identifed as worthy of protection 33 Some land 
26 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U S C §§1251 et seq ; CAA, 42 U S C §§7401 et seq ; 
ESA, 16 U S C §§1531 et seq ; RCRA Regulations Title 40 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations at parts 239 through 282  
27 See, e.g., 40 C F R §1508 20 (defning mitigation for operations under 
NEPA); Morgan Robertson & Palmer Hough, Wetlands Regulation: Te 
Case of Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, in Wetlands
171 (B A LePage ed 2011); Stephen M Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Miti-
gate: Te Continuing Constitutionality of Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v 
City of Tigard, 6 Fordham Envtl  L J  689 (1995)  
28 33 U S C  §1344  
29 16 U S C  §1539(a)  
30 Id. §1539(a)(2)(B)  
31 Id. §1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (v)  
32 Land Trust Alliance, Land Trusts, http://www landtrustalliance org/ 
land-trusts (last visited Apr  11, 2013)  
33 See, e.g., Jessica Owley, Use of Conservation Easements by Local Governments, 
in Greening Local Government 237, 244-46 (Patricia Salkin & Keith 
Hirokawa eds  2012)  
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trusts also work with public agencies to monitor and man-
age lands that they do not own 34 An even smaller number 
operate mitigation banks 35 
Land trusts often hold conservation easements asso-
ciated with compensatory mitigation 36 Tese exacted 
conservation easements are created to satisfy mitigation 
requirements in numerous laws, including local land use 
ordinances, state laws protecting natural resources, and 
federal laws like the permitting programs of §404 of the 
CWA and §10 of the ESA 37 As holders of exacted con-
servation easements, land trusts have the task of steward-
ing an essential element of the environmental regulatory 
regime Tey oversee and have enforcement responsibility 
for one of the major mitigation methods Tus, as hold-
ers of conservation easements, land trusts enforce environ-
mental laws in a way that can have just as much if not more 
impact on environmental protection as citizen suits  
B. 	 Conservation 	Easement 	Basics 
Conservation easements are nonpossessory interests in land 
that have environmental purposes 38 When a conservation 
easement burdens land, it either prohibits the landowner 
from doing something she would have otherwise been per-
mitted to do or enables someone else to do something on 
her land that she would have been otherwise able to pro-
hibit 39 Some conservation easements do both—restricting 
the landowner’s behavior and giving the land trust rights 
or obligations to conduct activities on the land Te 
rules for conservation easements generally come from 
state law 40 Tese state laws defne rules for conservation 
easements, including acceptable purposes and holders 41 
Tey also sometimes detail the methods for termination 
or modifcation of the agreements 42 Almost all states 
allow government agencies and nonproft organizations 
with conservation goals (i e , land trusts) to hold conser-
vation easements 43 
34 Jessica Owley & Stephen Tulowiecki, Te Future of Private Forests: Conserva-
tion Easements and the Forest Legacy Program, 33 Pub Land & Resources 
L  Rev  47, 71 (2012)  
35 See, e.g., The Nature Conservancy, Mississippi: Old Fort Bayou Miti-
gation Bank, http://www nature org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/ 
unitedstates/mississippi/placesweprotect/old-fort-bayou-mitigation-bank  
xml (last visited Apr  11, 2013)  
36 See, e.g., Bldg Indus Ass’n v Cty of Stanislaus, 118 Cal Rptr 3d 467, 
478 (2010) (describing role of land trusts in agricultural land mitiga-
tion program)  
37 Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements: Te Hard Case of Endangered 
Species Protection, 19 J Envtl L & Litig 293 (2004); Jessica Owley, Te 
Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 Neb L Rev 1043 (2006)  
38 Elizabeth Byers & Karin Marchetti Ponte, The Conservation Ease-
ment Handbook, 14-15 (2d ed  2005)  
39 4-34A Powell on Real Property §34A 01 
40 Id. 
41 Id. §34A 03[1]; Todd D Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Con-
servation Easements, in Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements 
Past, Present, and Future 26, 27-31, 35-40 (Julie Ann Gustanski & 
Roderick H  Squires eds  2000)  
42 Mayo, supra note 41, at 42-45  
43 California and Oregon add recognized tribes to the list, while Arizona 
does not recognize the ability of government entities to hold conserva-
tion easements  
Conservation easements look like private contracts but 
are actually servitudes,44 usually burdening land in perpe-
tuity 45 Tey are a favored tool of permit-issuing agencies 
for preservation components of compensatory mitigation 
For example, where a mitigation program requires preser-
vation of existing wetlands, agencies want a guarantee that 
the preservation will be more than temporary One way to 
do this is to use property law tools to restrict potential con-
ficting land uses on the preserved wetlands Traditional 
covenants may work in some jurisdictions and on some 
properties, but increasingly agencies are requiring conser-
vation easements Tese perpetual restrictions can circum-
scribe the use of land and help to ensure that the wetlands 
remain wetlands 46 
C. 	 Conservation 	Easements 	as 	Private 	
Environmental 	Enforcement 
Like citizen suits, conservation easements can be used 
to privatize environmental law enforcement Conserva-
tion easements exacted under environmental permitting 
schemes play a central role in environmental protection 
Tus, ensuring the viability and permanence of such con-
servation easements is a necessary step in meeting environ-
mental protection goals Enforcement of environmental 
permits should include monitoring and enforcement of 
the mitigation associated with the permits If the mitiga-
tion required in exchange for a permit is not meaningful, 
the permit should not be allowed to remain in operation 
Oversight of permits is challenging generally; oversight of 
the mitigation projects is even more complicated  
Although similar to citizen suits because they put non-
proft environmental organizations in the role of enforcer, 
conservation easements difer from citizen suits because 
they impede public enforcement mechanisms Citizen suit 
provisions supplement public enforcement Indeed, if the 
permitting agency decides to pursue its own enforcement 
action, the citizen enforcer must step aside With conserva-
tion easements, the structure is quite diferent In many 
cases, the land trust is the sole entity that has the ability to 
enforce the agreement It is not clear that the permitting 
agency has an ability to enforce the terms of the agreement 
unless it is included in the language of the conservation 
easement deed as a third-party enforcer  
44 Restatement 3d of Property: Servitudes, §1 1 (cmt  d)  
45 Mayo, supra note 41, at 40-42  
46 Perhaps this is overstating the ability of conservation easements Tey can 
seek to prevent land uses that would confict with wetlands, but few con-
servation easements include afrmative obligations or active management 
See Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, 
74 Law & Contemp Probs 199 (2011) Where wetlands are at risk due to 
climate change or of-site actions, conservation easements will not be able to 
ensure that the wetland remains a wetland, only that property owners do not 
drain or fll the wetland directly Similarly, conservation easements for spe-
cies habitat mitigation prevent incompatible uses, but do not guarantee the 
persistence of the species on the property See Adena R Rissman, Evaluating 
Conservation Efectiveness and Adaptation in Dynamic Landscapes, 74 Law & 
Contemp  Probs  145, 153 (2011)  
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D. 	 Uncertainty 	Regarding 	Land	Trust 	Enforcement 	
Capacity 
Tere are no specifc requirements for land trusts holding 
exacted conservation easements State conservation ease-
ment laws detail what types of organizations are permis-
sible holders, but these standards are broad and it is not 
even clear that they would apply to land trusts operating 
under a federal scheme 47 Tere is no specifcation as to 
size, capacity, or experience of the land trust 48 Tere are no 
regulations requiring them to follow certain procedures  
Te Land Trust Alliance has created an accreditation 
program for land trusts and has its own standards and 
practices that it urges land trusts to follow 49 Accreditation, 
a form of private standard setting, is voluntary, and the 
Alliance is limited in the number of accreditation applica-
tions it can process each year 50 Public agencies governing 
the mitigation processes have not required accreditation  
When it comes to stewardship of conservation easements 
used for mitigation, there are no requirements for monitor-
ing reports or continued public oversight Te land trusts 
appear to have a free hand in amending, terminating, and 
enforcing the conservation easements While accreditation 
repercussions or obligations related to tax or charitable 
trust law maintain checks on the land trusts, the environ-
mental laws (and the environmental permitting agencies) 
do not have a voice in key decisions regarding the conser-
vation easements Land trust power to shape conservation 
easement boundaries and rules means that these private 
organizations have the power to shape mitigation policy 
Teir role as holder of conservation easements places them 
in the role of private enforcer of environmental permitting 
laws, even though they do not have a direct connection to 
the permit document or permit issuance  
E. 	 Challenges 	to 	Conservation 	Easement 	
Enforcement 
Te citizen suit provisions of environmental law do not 
appear to extend to enforcing conservation easements 
While citizens can bring actions for permit violations, 
what route for relief do they have where the conservation 
easement associated with the permit is violated? State law 
generally limits enforcement of conservation easements 
to the parties to the agreement (with some exceptions for 
adjoining landowners, attorneys general, and a few speci-
fed state agencies) If a conservation easement is violated, 
arguably the permit is violated Tis should enable a cause 
of action against the permit holder, but the remedy may 
be unsatisfying Te permit holder may have little connec-
tion to the conservation easement and no control over it 
47 See Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements: Emerging Concerns With 
Enforcement, Probate & Property 51, 54 (Jan /Feb  2012)  
48 See Owley & Tulowiecki, supra note 34, at 89-90  
49 Land Trust Alliance, Accreditation, http://www landtrustalliance org/ 
training/accreditation (last visited Apr  11, 2013)  
50 Land Trust Accreditation Commission, Getting Accredited, http:// 
www landtrustaccreditation org/the-process (last visited Apr  11, 2013)  
Revocation of the permit may not obtain the sought-after 
environmental beneft  
To even get to the point where a citizen considers bring-
ing suit however, the citizen would have to be able to learn 
about the conservation easement Tis is no simple task 51 
It is common for permits to require conservation easements 
without detailing where the conservation easement will be, 
who will hold it, or what its terms will be Public agencies 
rarely maintain a legal interest in the conservation ease-
ments (by becoming co-holders or third-party enforcers, 
for example)  
Citizen suits for enforcement are built on the availability 
of information about environmental permits Tat infor-
mation is lacking with conservation easements Although 
both the permits and conservation easements are public 
documents, they are not easy to obtain or track down 
Where one can obtain a permit, it may be difcult to also 
get a copy of the conservation easement that embodies the 
mitigation required in the permit Te mitigation details, 
the very elements we want to enforce, may thus be hidden 
from view For example, I examined the §10 ESA permit 
for San Bruno Mountain in San Mateo County, Califor-
nia 52 Examining the associated HCP revealed references to 
the developers’ intention to use habitat easements to meet 
mitigation needs 53 Te plan did not explain in any detail 
what the conservation easements would look like, where 
they would be located, or who would hold them 54 Track-
ing down those conservation easements was challenging 
Repeated phone calls and e-mails to the public agencies, 
consultants, and developers only yielded one conservation 
easement (even though many acknowledged that conserva-
tion easements were used pervasively in the project) 55 Tus, 
even where I knew conservation easements were operating, 
I could not locate copies of them or learn who held them 
Citizen enforcers are likely to face similar challenges 56 
Beyond locating permits and associated mitigation 
documents, it can be difcult to determine when permit 
violations occur First, if we can’t fnd the documents, we 
have no way of knowing whether the mitigation programs 
are being carried out correctly (if at all) Under the ESA, 
citizens can bring suit against permit violators (or indeed 
51 See Amy Wilson Morris & Adena R Rissman, Public Access to Information 
on Private Land Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 Wis 
L  Rev  1237 (2009)  
52 Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements 146-48 (Ph D Dis-
sertation, Univ  of California at Berkeley 2005)  
53 San Bruno Mountain Habitat Conservation Plan I-3, San Bruno 
Mountain Habitat Conservation Plan Implementation Agreement,
§V See Owley, supra note 52 at 148-49  
54 See Owley, supra note 52 at 150-55  
55 Owley, supra note 52 at 146-48  
56 Tis is not to say, however, that there are no ongoing eforts to catalog and 
locate conservation easements By far, the largest such efort is the National 
Conservation Easement Database whose goal is “providing a comprehensive 
picture of the estimated 40 million acres of conservation easement lands,” 
http://www conservationeasement us/ For a comprehensive discussion of 
the need for transparent and easy to use conservation easement databases 
and recording systems, see James L Olmsted, Te Invisible Forest: Conser-
vation Easement Databases and the End of the Clandestine Conservation of 
Natural Lands, 74 Law & Contemp  Probs 51 (2011)  
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any violators of the statute) 57 But the struggle of fnding 
the information makes it challenging to learn when permit 
violations occur Furthermore, because conservation ease-
ments burden private land, access to the property to assess 
compliance is limited to those parties recognized in the 
conservation easement deed  
Capacity and oversight concerns merge with the issue 
of enforcement Repercussions for lack of enforcement 
are unclear What do we do when private groups are not 
good at environmental protection? Tere are lots of faws 
with public actors, but avenues for recourse against public 
actors are a bit clearer We have a general sense of what our 
legal and political options are when we do not think that a 
public agency is doing the right thing, but this gets harder 
when we are looking at the actions of a private party What 
happens when the land trust does not enforce the conser-
vation easement? Tis may happen by mistake (the land 
trust does not realize that there is a violation) or quite con-
sciously Te land trust may decide that the infractions are 
not worth the expense of enforcement and litigation Te 
land trust may determine that the property is not really 
that valuable 58 Tus, whether the decision not to enforce is 
due to a lack of capacity or is strategic, it is not clear what 
recourses are available when enforcement does not occur  
III.  Lessons Conservation Easements Can 
Learn From Citizen Suits 
Current market problems have led to cash-strapped envi-
ronmental enforcement agencies Public agencies without 
funding to support desired levels of environmental enforce-
ment may rely on citizen suits to guide enforcement actions 
Moreover, agencies might view conservation easements as 
an attractive option for environmental protection gener-
ally, and for permit mitigation requirements specifcally 
Land-trust-held and administered conservation easements 
have the power to improve environmental health without 
requiring cumbersome public oversight and involvement 
Yet, as articulated above, conservation easements as a mode 
of public enforcement leave much to be desired in terms of 
public information and accountability  
Te nontrivial concerns raised above concerning con-
servation easements indicate a need to change the current 
structure of private enforcement eforts One approach 
would be to limit the role of conservation easements If 
the structure of conservation easement deeds is such that 
improving oversight and involving others in enforcement 
will degrade the strengths of the tool, perhaps conser-
vation easements should not play a role in environmen-
tal permitting schemes Alternatively, perhaps there are 
ways to treat the private actors (land trusts) more like 
public actors, applying public information and account-
57 16 U S C  §1540(g)  
58 I do not mean to convey that this is something that would happen com-
monly Land trusts tend to be watchful diligent enforcers In fact, they are 
likely better at overseeing conservation easements than public holders are 
Te point here is that it is not clear what to do when a land trust does not 
live up to this ideal  
ability laws to these entities If we think of stewardship 
of exacted conservation easements (or mitigation con-
servation easements) as a type of private enforcement of 
environmental laws, perhaps citizen suits can ofer some 
guidance for improvement  
Citizen suits thrive on information Increasing the avail-
ability of information about conservation easements can 
foster improved environmental protection Simply increas-
ing public scrutiny often results in improved environmen-
tal compliance from regulated entities A similar efect may 
be present with land trusts Public attention to land trust 
activities may improve environmental protection outcomes 
Clearly, associating conservation easements with the under-
lying permits can also work to help members of the public 
(and even agencies themselves) track mitigation programs  
Adding some level of review of land trust actions would 
go even further Tis can be as simple as including per-
mitting agencies as third-party enforcers (or making them 
co-holders of the conservation easements) Such agency 
involvement could provide an avenue for enforcing these per-
mit obligations through agency-forcing actions (e g , bring-
ing suit against an agency for failing to properly monitor 
or enforce conservation easements) Adding explicit judicial 
review to the mix could also improve environmental protec-
tion outcomes While parties to conservation easements can 
bring judicial actions regarding enforcement or to challenge 
terms, there are no clear mechanisms for agencies or mem-
bers of the public to do so—not even the permit holder or 
permit issuer 59 Uncertainty in standing requirements, along 
with a lack of citizen suit provision for conservation ease-
ments, hampers enforcement challenges by anyone other 
than the signatories to the agreement 60 
As understanding of environmental ills increases, so too 
does the need for a public response to those problems To 
meet this growing need in an era of shrinking budgets, 
public agencies are turning to nonproft environmental 
organizations and other community members for help 
Not all private options are created equal When private 
enforcers supplant instead of complement public programs, 
we should be increasingly suspect By examining two types 
of private enforcement of environmental laws, this Article 
highlights why programs like citizen suits that involve the 
private citizens but do not crowd out public enforcers are 
democracy-enhancing and likely to lead to improved envi-
ronmental health Programs using land trusts to enforce 
permit mitigation requirements, on the other hand, hide 
information from public eyes and may complicate eforts 
at environmental protection  
59 Tere are, however, cases where courts have deemed private actors to be so 
agency-like that the courts impose the same review mechanisms on them 
as public agencies would be subjected to Tese cases have mostly emerged 
in British courts with a reluctance to follow them by American courts 
Compare Regina v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, 1 Q B 815, 820-
22 (1987) (self-regulatory panel subject to judicial review), with Jackson v 
Met Edison Co , 419 U S 345, 352 (1974) (holding that utility was not 
subject to state action doctrine)  
60 Carol Necole Brown, A Time to Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-Party 
Rights in Perpetual Conservation Easements, 40 Ga  L  Rev  85, 109 (2005)  
